Previous studies on the link between the interventions of the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and exchange rate volatility have mainly used intervention data as reported by the financial press. We use official intervention data for the period 1993-2000 that were released only recently by the BoJ and find a positive link between of the BoJ and the volatility of the yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate. We find, in particular, that those BoJ interventions that were not reported in the financial press were positively correlated with exchange rate volatility. 
Introduction
Over the past two decades, the effects of central bank interventions in foreign exchange markets on exchange rate volatility have been the focus of a number of empirical studies (see, e.g., Dominguez 1998 and Aguilar/Nydahl 2000). Researchers have not only been interested in the magnitude of the effect of central bank interventions on exchange rate volatility but also in the sign of this effect. The importance of the sign of this effect stems from the fact that the exchange rate theories often applied in the intervention literature have clear-cut implications with respect to the sign of the effect of central bank interventions on exchange rate volatility.
For example, a model frequently used in the literature to describe the intervention-volatility correlation is the asset-pricing model of exchange rate determination. As discussed by Dominguez (1998) , this standard forward-looking rational expectations exchange rate model implies that, due to its stabilizing effects on agents' exchange rate expectations, a credible central bank intervention should either dampen exchange rate volatility or should not affect exchange rate volatility at all. If, in contrast, interventions are not credible or the monetary authorities send out ambiguous signals, central bank interventions should amplify exchange rate volatility.
We provide further evidence on the sign of the intervention-volatility correlation by using a new official data set on Bank of Japan (BoJ) interventions in the U.S. dollar/yen foreign exchange market. 1 In the past, no official data were available to researchers because the BoJ did not release official data on its intervention behavior. Lacking official intervention data, previous studies mainly used intervention reports in the financial press to analyze the link between BoJ interventions and exchange rate volatility (see, e.g., Bonser-Neal/Tanner 1996, Dominguez 1998, Galati/Melick 1999). 2 However, as we argue in this paper, for the sample period we analyze, intervention reports in the financial press are likely to represent a relatively inaccurate proxy of the actual BoJ intervention policy. The analysis we present in this paper is not subject to this inaccuracy because we use official intervention data recently released by the BoJ to test for the link between the BoJ interventions and the volatility of the U.S. dollar /yen exchange rate. To measure exchange rate volatility, we use volatilities implicit in foreign currency options. Our key finding is that the BoJ interventions were 1 In Japan, the jurisdiction over deciding on whether or not to intervene in the foreign exchange market rests with the Japanese Ministry of Finance. The Bank of Japan conducts transactions as an agent of the Ministry of Finance. See Ito (2002) for a discussion of the institutional details. 2 An empirical study also using official BoJ data is Baillie and Osterberg (1997) . They study the impact of cental bank interventions on the risk premium in the forward market during the period 1985 -1990 . Ito (2002 uses the data we analyze in this paper to study the effect of the interventions conducted by the BoJ in the 1990s on the level of the U.S. dollar/yen exchange rate.
positively correlated with the volatility of the U.S. dollar/yen exchange rate during our sample period 1993-2000. This effect tends to be particularly strong for those ("secret") BoJ interventions that were not reported in the financial press. We also find a positive link between interventions and exchange rate volatility for the U.S. dollar purchases of the BoJ.
Our results also indicate that coordination of foreign exchange market interventions between the BoJ and the Federal Reserve (Fed) did not change the positive sign of the interventionvolatility correlation.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. In section 2, we lay out the quantitative model we use in our empirical analysis and describe some stylized facts of the official BoJ intervention data. In section 3, we present our empirical estimates and discuss our results. In section 4, we conclude.
The Empirical Model and the Data
To analyze the link between BoJ interventions and exchange rate volatility, we use a research strategy similar to the one suggested by Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) and Dominguez (1998). Specifically, we estimate the following equation: (1) where ISD t denotes the implied volatility of yen/U.S. dollar foreign currency options on day t.
We use implied volatilities of at-the-money forward over-the-counter yen/U.S. dollar foreign currency options collected at 11:30 a.m. New York time (London closing) as compiled by a large investment bank. The time-to-maturity of the options is one month. 3 The key advantage of using implied volatilities to estimate the intervention-volatility correlation is that implied volatilities embody market participants' expectations regarding the perceived exchange rate volatility over the remaining time to maturity of the options and are, therefore, forward-3 In the over-the-counter market for foreign currency options, option traders use implied volatilities for the Garman/Kohlhagen (1983) currency option pricing model to quote the price of an option. Because the volatility of the exchange rate is the only unobservable input variable in the Garman-Kohlhagen model, the dollar price of an option can easily be computed upon plugging the implied volatility quote into the GarmanKohlhagen model. Also note that the strike price of the at-the-money forward options we use is equal to the forward rate, so that, given put-call parity, the price of a put is equal to the price of the corresponding call option. The option quotes we use in our empirical analysis are averages of the respective bid and ask quotes. . 5 It is interesting to note that on October 7, 1998, the yen price of a dollar fell from about 134 to 120 on a single day. This strong change in the exchange rate was accompanied by a sudden rise of expected exchange rate volatility: the annualized yen/U.S. dollar option-implied volatility rose to a historical high of roughly 40 percent. For economic reasons discussed in detail in Cai et al. (2001), we do not treat this outburst of implied volatility as an outlier in our empirical analysis. The reason we do not is that the sharp appreciation of the yen in October 1998 was caused by the trading behavior of investors who suddenly unwound the short positions in yen they had accumulated. Taking such short positions had been profitable because investors could borrow funds in Japanese currency at interest rates near zero and invest these funds in securities yielding higher interest rates. The massive unwinding of short positions in yen in October 1998 resulted in bandwagon effects because many investors had to cover their short positions. As a result, exchange rate volatility rose sharply.
dollars. The unconditional probability of a BoJ intervention was 8.3 percent. The mean absolute size of BoJ interventions, conditional on the fact that an intervention took place, was 147 billion yen. Journal.
-Insert Table 2 about here. - Table 2 shows that, according to the newspaper reports on BoJ interventions, the BoJ intervened on 50 days during the period 1995-1999, the sample period studied by Ramaswamy/Samiei (2000). Because the BoJ actually conducted foreign exchange market interventions on 66 days, this implies that the financial press underestimated the overall intervention activity of the BoJ by roughly 25 percent. When breaking down the overall intervention activity with respect to the direction of intervention, the degree of inaccuracy appears to be even larger. The financial press reported 39 interventions aimed at weakening the yen; whereas, in fact, 60 of such interventions were actually carried out. Table 2 also shows that the financial press overestimated the intervention activity aimed at strengthening the yen. While eleven interventions were reported, only six interventions actually took place.
With respect to the interventions conducted by the BoJ jointly with the Fed (that is, coordinated interventions), Table 2 reveals that the number of press reports of coordinated interventions published in the financial press was quite accurate. Of the nine reported coordinated interventions, only two interventions (one sell and one buy intervention) were not classified correctly.
-Insert Table 3 about here. -
In Table 3 , we examine whether there was a link between the magnitude of interventions and the likelihood of a press report of interventions. We do this by classifying the actual and the reported interventions conducted by the BoJ according to their size. As evidenced by the results summarized in Table 3 , there was no clear-cut correlation between the size of BoJ intervention in the yen/U.S. dollar market and press reports of intervention. press for the period 1993-1996. Of course, the results reported in these studies cannot be directly compared with our results because of differences in, for instance, the sample period analyzed and the estimation methods used. Nevertheless, the fact that our results resemble the findings in the empirical studies mentioned above raises the question whether we would also find a positive correlation between volatility and BoJ interventions when we use the intervention reports of the financial press instead of the actual intervention data. In order to analyze this question, we use the data set on press reports of BoJ interventions compiled by Ramaswamy/Samiei (2000). As described in detail in Section 2, their data set on press reports of BoJ interventions covers the period 1995-1999.
Results of the Empirical Study
In order to study the potential link between (expected) exchange rate volatility and the press reports of BoJ interventions, we proceed as follows (see Table 5 ). In a first step, we estimate again our benchmark model given in equation (1) for the sub period 1995-1999. The estimation results for this first specification are given in the second column of Table 4 . As can be seen, the results we obtain for the entire sample period 1993-2000 also hold when we focus on the sub period 1995-1999. 6 This shows that our results are robust with respect to the specification of the sample period. In a second step, we split up the interventions of the BoJ into those interventions that were not reported in the financial press ("secret" interventions) and those interventions that were correctly reported in the financial press. The estimation results for this second specification are given in column (2) of Table 5 . The estimation results reveal that the BoJ foreign exchange market interventions that were not reported in the financial press are positively correlated with exchange rate volatility. In a third step, we add a dummy variable to specification (2). This dummy variable assumes the value one whenever the financial press reported a BoJ intervention but no BoJ intervention had taken place actually, and otherwise assumes the value zero. The estimation results for this third specification are given in column (3) of Table 5 . Again, we can see that only those interventions that were not reported in the financial press were strongly positively correlated with exchange rate volatility. One reason for this interesting result could be that such "secret"
interventions were less well understood by market participants (and the financial press) and, thereby, tended to give rise to rumors about central bank intervention activities in the foreign exchange market. It could be that such rumors created uncertainty, so that, as a result, exchange rate volatility increased.
These results confirm the results documented by Dominguez (1998) , according to which especially secret foreign exchange market interventions by central banks, i.e., interventions that are undertaken without notification of the public, tend to be positively correlated with exchange rate volatility. Our results further indicate that, given the inaccuracy of press reports of BoJ interventions we find for our sample period, it may be important to differentiate between correct and incorrect reports of BoJ intervention in the financial press when such
press reports are used to analyze the impact of the BoJ interventions on exchange rate volatility. This again demonstrates the importance of having official intervention data at hand when analyzing the potential link between BoJ interventions and exchange rate volatility.
-Insert Table 6 .
The results show that exchange rate volatility did not exert a significant effect on the propensity of the BoJ to intervene.
-Insert Table 6 were correlated with the volatility of the yen/U.S. dollar spot exchange rate. Our findings suggest that, during the period under investigation, the BoJ interventions were, on average, positively linked to the yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate volatility. Moreover, our findings indicate that especially "secret" BoJ interventions, that is, interventions that were not reported in the financial press, tended to be associated with an increase in exchange rate volatility.
7 Because we use daily data, we cannot rule out that there were high-frequency (intra-day) feedback effects between exchange rate volatility and interventions. In addition, although the results of our causality analysis are suggestive, one should note that the empirical approach we use in this paper is not structural in nature so that one should be somewhat cautious when interpreting our results as providing evidence for a causal effect running from interventions to volatility. Note, however, that the fact that we include lagged implied volatility data in our vector of regressors allows us to take into account a potential simultaneity bias arising from a reversed causality running from volatility to interventions. As pointed out by Bonser-Neal/Tanner (1996), if intervention is correlated with lagged volatility, the effect of intervention measured by equation (1) is conditional on the realization of volatility. Note: We give t-statistics in parentheses. We use robust standard errors to compute the t-statistics. ** = Significant at the 5 percent level, *** = Significant at the 1 percent level. We measure interventions in billions of yen. All independent variables are in absolute values. We multiply all coefficients by 100. Note: We give t-statistics in parentheses. We use robust standard errors to compute the t-statistics. *** = Significant at the one percent level. Interventions are measured in billions of yen. We use the absolute value of the interventions in the case of unreported actual interventions and reported actual interventions. When the press incorrectly reported a BoJ intervention, we use a dummy variable that assumes the value one in the case of a wrong report and zero else. We multiply all coefficients by 100. 
